Saturday 26 September 2009

Nadir gets the Turban







The Pashtun tribe from which the Afghan royals come have chosen their leader. At a tribal gathering they placed the turban on HRH Prince Nadir Naim.

Monday 21 September 2009

Is this the end of the Taliban?

It was reported in The Independant on Mon Sept 21st from Islamabad that the infamous Sher Mohammed Qasab was captured in a raid at Mingora, he was wounded and his three sons were killed. A military spokesman said "He was severely wounded and succumbed to his wounds early this morning." Another Military Official said the death of Qasab who killed many civilians, policemen and troops would reassure the residents of the tourist valley that the "Taliban were finished!" Pakistani troops have made significent gains against the militants in their Swat offensive after Taliban advances raised fears for the nuclear armed Pakistan future and contributed to a slide in investor confidence.

Maybe the Taliban have just moved across the border into Afghanistan.

There is in the Helmand province a couple of buildings known as "Rose Cottage" here 60 soldiers are making the "final journey" home, as this has been the deadliest summer of the British forces time in Afghanistan. A couple of soldiers with decades of experience between them have been in charge of the army's morgue, this must have been one of the most depressing jobs.

Could this be because of the British soldier unlike the U. S. soldier does not have armour to cover their groin and neck. A senior surgeon said that "We have seen a lot of groin and neck injuries in U.K. not otherwise seen in US Marines because of this piece of equipment" Wheras the US Kevlar is a lighter body armour and has the important groin plate and they have modular neck and shoulder protection!!

It is not a lot to ask that in giving there lives for this cause they have the resouces to finish the job.

Thursday 17 September 2009

Helmand Province

This troubled area with occasional Suicide bombers (though 80% of the deaths amongst allied armed forces are from IEDs) in fact on the 17th of Sept a member of our forces in the Gereshk district died in a blast on foot patrol in southern Afghanistan. The Afghans from this area have banded together and driven the Taliban out just as the British did in the Civil War in the fourteenth century. As in Northern Ireland and The Balkans it takes the people to say NO. Think of the children, mothers and fathers even in this country with the MPs etc taking a huge whack of bonuses as a golden handshake! Northern Rock and the Lehman Brothers - what did they ever do for humanity? I am sure they would say that they individually may have done a lot, but the public perception of them is dubious.

These families in the Hellman province just want recognition from the West, as there is life after Poppies. Unfortunately Kasai and his brother are implicated by this and Kasai has given prominent roles to members of his family.

A soldier who comes from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment died in Selly Oak Birmingham and I hear today that 16 were killed the in area today - they were the Italian soldiers who were killed.

Meanwhile, as Kasai says the elections were a success, the soft spoken Grant Kipper a Canadian working as a member of the UN, is not so sure.

NCF Afghanistan Working Group Report

The Afghanistan Working Group has recently finished this policy paper after a meeting a few weeks ago. In this brief paper we address the central problem of state credibility (which Karzai has been complicit in destroying), call for better military and economic aid coordination and a re-thought strategy of governance that concentrates on local, rather than central, systems.


We hope you find our ideas interesting and we look forward to any feedback that you can provide.



Afghanistan:

Forging Credibility

The fundamental aim of Western intervention in Afghanistan is to establish long-term stability and pave the way for economic and human development.

Corruption is the most pressing issue in Afghanistan. Endemic corruption invalidates state credibility. In order for Afghanistan to move towards stability and peace, the state must gain the faith of its citizens. This requires urgent reform of the political and bureaucratic leadership.

Western policy in Afghanistan should focus on developing a credible government that reverses corruption and captures the faith of the Afghan people and foreign investors. This credibility will provide a foundation:

(1) For an Afghan security strategy that delivers safety and stability at a local level

(2) For a co-ordinated national economic development strategy delivered at grassroots level.

By a coordinated effort, the US and UK governments could steer a reformed Afghan administration towards combating corruption rather than proliferating it.

This paper is divided into four parts that provide recommended guidelines for Western policy


Part 1: Diplomatic Leverage to develop Afghan state credibility

I. Development of a strategy, supported by a unified international community, of diplomatic leverage to co-opt the existing Afghan state to clear out its corrupt leaders.

A. Convene a national loya jirga to select replacement ministers that fit agreed criteria of transparency and credibility.

B. “Sticks”: Hard-line measures to force the Afghan administration into action.

1. Threaten to withhold all international community donations from the Afghan government.

2. Threaten to place the ANSF under direct ISAF command.

3. Threaten to withdraw the support which organisations such as OPIC currently give to private sector investors in Afghanistan.[1]

4. Raise the possibility of terminating all reconstruction efforts currently administered through governmental organizations (USAID, NATO, UN, etc.)

C. “Carrots”: Strong incentives for investment in Afghanistan as it becomes increasingly credible.

1. Technical and other assistance in the development of markets and financial institutions

2. Provide contracts to Afghan firms on a preferential basis if they can provide transparent accounting and results


Part 2: Localized governance to play to Afghanistan’s strengths

I. Afghanistan’s strong tradition of local governance should be better supported as a governance development strategy.

A. The Taliban initially gained, and is gaining, support because it offers “justice” with an alacrity that Western courts cannot within a familiar socio-religious context.

B. Local governance allows the population to better monitor its officials and reduces the potential of corruption by middlemen.

C. Local security should increasingly be put into the hands of local people, in coordination with the ANSF, similar to the lashkar model in Pakistan.



Part 3: International coordination to maximize military effectiveness

I. NATO and non-NATO troop contributing countries should formally agree upon one unified chain of command. This should include US forces who currently operate within a parallel command structure as Operation Enduring Freedom.

II. Concurrent with the streamlining of the ISAF command structure, a coherent and clear nationwide counter-insurgency strategy should be developed. This strategy must increase the prevalence of “clear-hold-build” provincial reconstruction teams and emphasize reconstruction and development.

III. The performance of private contractors in training the ANSF should be completely re-evaluated company by company on the basis of results achieved.



Part 4: Economic frameworks for sustainable development

I. Aid Coordination

A. All aid should be channelled by means of an “Aid Council for Afghanistan” which will co-ordinate the work of both government and non-governmental organizations.

B. Donors should work with local governments to develop a long-term strategy for aid application.

II. More use could be made of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the “clear-hold-build” strategy as a tool for economic development. Potentially, PRTs could operate in a role essentially subordinate to local Afghan government, creating a more joined-up approach to reconstruction.

III. Using ISAF and ANSF resources, secure commercial hubs to encourage growth. This is in parallel to, but separate from PRT activities.

IV. Consider using opium licensing and export strategies, such as the Senlis Council’s Poppy for Medicine proposal, to allow farmers to transition smoothly into a licit economy.



[1] The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is an agency of the U.S. government. OPIC helps U.S. businesses invest overseas, fosters economic development in new and emerging markets, complements the private sector in managing risks associated with foreign direct investment, and supports U.S. foreign policy.

Tuesday 15 September 2009

A million and a half fraudulent votes

The local Afghan UN people are under presssure from UN New York not to make too much of a fuss over the Karzai vote fraud. Makes you sick the way those nasty little UN people are about to manipulate democracy for their own ends again. They did it in Iraq. Now Afghanistan. The UN are part of the problem not the solution - but at least in this instance they are honorable at grass roots level.

Saturday 12 September 2009

Taliban now controls Afghanistan


The support for more war in Afghanistan is waning fast amongst the democrats. House speaker Nancy Pelosi said, "I don't think there's a great deal of support for sending more troops to Afghanistan in the country or in the Congress."

Meanwhile, an organisation which Rupert was closely involved with at one time says the Taliban have a significant presence in almost every corner of Afghanistan, as the country lurches into political uncertainty after a disputed presidential election. A political standoff has deepened since the August 20 poll, with a U.N.-backed election watchdog invalidating some votes and ordering a partial recount amid widespread accusations of fraud. The uncertainty coincides with the most violent period since the Taliban were toppled by U.S.-backed Afghan forces in 2001, with record military and civilian deaths testing the resolve of U.S. and European leaders.

The Taliban now has a permanent presence in 80% of Afghanistan, up from 72% in November 2008, according to a new map released today by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS). According to ICOS, another 17% of Afghanistan is seeing ‘substantial’ Taliban activity. Taken together, these figures show that the Taliban has a significant presence in virtually all of Afghanistan.

Tuesday 1 September 2009

Are the elections making ethnic divides more entrenched?

Afghanistan’s elections were clearly far from free and fair. The biggest consequence of this largely symbolic act of “democracy” is the construction of a wider barrier between ethnic groups.

As the new government comes in nobody will really know if the results actually reflect the choices of voters. Furthermore, the scores of people who stayed home due to threats from insurgents had no say in the new government either. No administration that has been elected in such a fashion can enjoy the faith of the people.

The victor, mired in an environment of fraud and illegitimacy, will have a significant credibility problem. As a Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/world_agenda/article6810814.ece) article explains, no result coming from these elections will be seen as legitimate.

Karzai’s campaign has been accused of massive corruption in the electoral process and will be seen as completely fraudulent, diminishing any credibility Karzai’s government has acquired with non-Pashtuns in the north.

Karzai has diminished support from Pashtuns as well, thus, he has alienated both ethnic groups. Thus, a Karzai government will not only lack ethnic support from any group, it will be even weaker and illegitimate than it is now and therefore clearly unable to reconcile ethnic issues.

On the other hand, if the election monitors find evidence of widespread fraud, the numbers may turn out in Abdullah’s favor. Again, this resulting government will have minimal legitimacy among ethnic Pashtuns, leaving them feeling relatively deprived of a say in government.

Historically, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, governments unable to make credible commitments to the population as a whole tend to fall into a system where only specific elites from certain sectors of the population enjoy commitments, or benefits, from the government. Some portions of the population will then be relatively excluded from state services than others – the victor’s supporters will be reaping the benefits while the opposition will see little to no benefits from the new administration.

Before this occurs, the new administration will be presented with a very difficult choice. It will have to renege on any campaign promises it may have made in order to enter into new commitments with opposition parties to build the faith of other certain ethnic groups in the state.

If the new administration does not happen, any work to blur the lines of sectarian division done to date will be erased by further mobilization along ethnic lines. This may not spell the end for Afghanistan, but it will certainly be a step backwards in the nation-building process.